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STATUS OF PREPARATION OF PUBLICATIONS, STUDIES AND DOCUMENTS FOR THE WORLD CONFERENCE

Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

1. The attention of the Preparatory Committee is drawn to the attached study entitled "Poverty, marginalization, violence and the realization of human rights" prepared by Mr. Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro with the collaboration of Messrs. Malak El-Chichini and Tulio Kahn. The study was commissioned by the Centre for Human Rights pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 45/155 of 18 December 1990 and 46/116 of 17 December 1991.

2. The theme of the study corresponds to the first and second objectives of the World Conference on Human Rights; these two objectives, set out in paragraph 1 (a) and (b) of resolution 45/155, are the following:

> "To review and assess the progress that has been made in the field of human rights since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to identify obstacles and ways in which they can be overcome to further progress in this area".
>
> "To examine the relation between development and the enjoyment by everyone of economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights recognizing the importance of creating the conditions whereby everyone may enjoy these rights as set out in the International Covenants on Human Rights".

3. Indicative annotations issued by the Secretariat of the World Conference relating to the theme of the following study are to be found in paragraphs 4 to 7 of document A/CONF.157/PC/20.

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POVERTY, MARGINALIZATION, VIOLENCE AND THE REALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

by

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Note: Unedited text for circulation to the fourth session of the Preparatory Committee. The final edited version will be prepared for the World Conference.

INTRODUCTION

1. On the eve of year 2000, the survival of our common future is threatened by ecological disequilibrium, unsustainable development patterns, and the persistent division of the world between North and South and of nations between rich and poor. The dream of the Four Freedoms -freedom of speech and belief, and freedom from fear and want- preconized by the drafters of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights has not come through.

2. Most puzzling of all is the failure of the International Economic Order (IEO) to eradicate poverty and hunger. The ever increasing income disparities at both world and national levels has divided humanity in two: that of the wealthy, the employed, those who participate; and that of the poor, those who live on the margin of progress and prosperity, those whose right to development is violated, those who are "expendable." (Nerfin, 1986)

3. Despite significant advances in technological and economic growth, poverty persists throughout the world. The numbers are eloquent. More than one billion people live in absolute poverty, and another billion on the margin of poverty in a world population of 5.3 billion. (UNDP, 1992) Everyday 40 thousand children die of hunger or of disease. In Africa and Latin America, per capita income has decreased constantly during the last decade.

This situation is particularly dangerous at a time of worldwide expansion of democratic rule, it being known that political democracy will always be fragile until basic economic rights are guaranteed. At the national level, the poor are generally left out of the economic and political processes which largely determine their fate. In the same way, many Third World countries are in danger of being marginalized on the international scene.

4. Who is accountable for this situation? Is the origin of the problem political, economic or social, or is it a combination of issues that must be treated globally? Are we dealing with human rights violations? What kind of solutions can be devised individually, collectively, nationally and internationally?

5. We will begin with a brief analysis of the progress made in the field of human rights since the 1948 Universal Declaration, particularly in regard to social, economic and cultural rights. We will discuss poverty, marginalization, and violence, and investigate their relation to human rights, development and democracy. In this respect, we have looked into the existing literature, especially the reports of the main international development agencies, to have a better understanding of present realities and recent trends. We have made use of their statistics and findings to establish relations between the economic, social and political variables, in order to study their interactions and to identify their effects on human rights realizations. Lastly, prospective solutions are proposed for overcoming obstacles to the attainment of the right to development, both at national and international levels.

I. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS

A. International Human Rights Instruments

6. Our purpose is to follow the evolution of the second and third generation of human rights in the main international instruments, to point out the main conceptual developments and their place in today's world.

We would like to thank Ms. Julie Anne Harrold, from the University of Minnesotta, an intern at the Center for the Study of Violence, University of Sao Paulo, for her contribution to this report.

7. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights created, for the first time in history, a system of fundamental principles covering civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights, which was expressly and freely accepted by the great majority of the world's peoples, through their respective governments. In the text of its articles, the Universal Declaration encompasses all essential elements of the three generations of human rights: the first generation of civil and political rights (*liberté* -articles 1-21); the second generation of economic, social and cultural rights (*égalité* -articles 22-27); and the third generation of solidarity rights (*fraternité* -article 28). (re: *Karel Vasak)*

Though not a treaty, the Universal Declaration is a system of values which has become universal *de facto* due to its acceptance as "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations." In the opening of the Preamble, the spirit of the Universal Declaration is spelled out: "the inherent dignity and (..) the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." This is followed by an important warning "if man is not to be compelled, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law".

8. The two other instruments that make up the International Bill of Rights, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, were put into effect only 18 years later, in 1976. As of October 1991, there were 93 States parties to the first Covenant and 100 to the second.

When States become parties to Covenants, they are accepting major obligations: one, to bring national law and practice into line with the provisions of the international legal instrument: and two. become answerable to the international community by reporting regularly on w . they have done. As a counterpart, the scope of the covenants is often more restricted and their provisions more gradual, to allow governments to fulfill their obligations.

9. The Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (CSECR) spells out the three basic rights already included in the Universal Declaration:
.the right to work in just and favourable conditions;
.the right to social protection, to an adequate standard of living and to the highest attainable standards of health;
.the right to education and to the enjoyment of the benefits of cultural and scientific achievements.

The Covenant broke new ground by addressing the second important task of governments and of the international system: the implementation process. Government policies are made responsible for the advancement of human rights, through the promotion of economic, social and cultural development, and the adoption of international economic and technical co-operation programmes. However, because of the implications linked to the adhesion, the CSECR stipulates objectives rather than standards, and requires gradual implementation over time rather than immediate realization. Besides, if economic or social rights of individuals are violated, no effective sanations are established.

10. The Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by the General Assembly in December 1986 opens up a new generation of rights, which reflects the aspiration for a better world mentioned in article 28 of the Universal Declaration: "Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration can be fully realized". Whereas the International Bill of Rights is an instrument designed to ensure the general well-being of every individual, the Declaration is an important step towards the overall concept of human rights, that reflects our deepest aspiration for a better world.

Development is described as a comprehensive economic, social and political

process, that aims at the constant improvement of all indivividuals and of all peoples, on the basis of their free and active participation in the development process, and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom. The right to development is both individual and collective. The concept of international responsibility is strongly emphasized, and equality of opportunity for development becomes the prerogative of both nations and individuals. The efforts of the international community should be accompanied by the promotion of "a new international economic order, based on sovereign equality, interdependence, mutual interest and co-operation among all States."

11. The recognition and universalization of second and third generation rights as human rights has been a slow conquest, which has progressively evolved with the historical, political, economic and cultural conditions prevailing in modern society. A number of basic concepts were reinforced while new ones emerged:

- poverty, defined as the lack of satisfaction of basic human needs, is a human rights violation. Those who suffer from hunger, malnutrition, lack of education, absence of health care, have to be given the opportunity a decent life, through State action nationally and/or together with the international community;
- international human rights instruments have spelled out standards which oblige governments and international organizations to respect the right to development as a human right, and to create conditions for the realization of the polincal, economic, social and cultural rights it includes;
- development is no limited to economic growth. The overall goal of development, as seen by international development agencies, is to increase the economic, political, cultural and civil rights of all people gender, ethnic group, religion, race or region. Human rights standards, such as equality of opportunity, social rights, political and civil freedoms, are an integral part of any human development assessement.

B. OBSTACLES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

12. Unfortunately, despite the wide acceptance of human rights instruments, progress in the area of social and economic rights has lagged behind the spirit of the texts and the expectations of a better world for all. A number of reasons can be advanced to explain the discrepancy between aspirations and reality.

a) Legal and procedural obstacles.

The degree of precision with which political and civil rights have been elaborated contrasts with the loose treatment given to social, economic and cultural rights. The latter have usually been treated as part of a country's economic policy and dissociated from human rights concerns. Moreover, the obligations they imply are vague, and are thus difficult to enforce legally.

While civil and political activism has been aimed at the defense of individual rights, the violations of economic, social and cultural rights is a consequence of collective situation, against which defense action requires a more complex process, accountability being more difficult to determine.

In short, two specific legal obstacles have to be overcome to achieve effective law enforcement: the lack of precision in regard to the corresponding obligations; and the lack of recourse procedures or institutions to which individuals or collectivities have access for the determination of the violation.

b) Conflicting nature of human rights

The interdependence of human rights does not necessarily mean their complementarity; on the contrary, there is often an antinomy between the laws. Equality and solidarity translated into social rights place limits on

traditional individual freedoms, such as the right to property. *(see Bobbio, 1990)* Values, such as equality and well-being, are freedoms realized through state intervention, based on political decisions. The real question is how the State ensures the optimal balance between individual freedoms and collective satisfaction.

c) Scarcity of resources

The problem faced by the governments of many poor nations is that they do not have the means to protect their citizens' social and economic rights, either for lack of economic resources or for lack of effective political power to bring about changes in resource distribution. Moreover, the IEO did not create the conditions for an equitable development cooperation.

d) Structural violations of human rights

The economic, social and cultural human rights violations are, in many cases, in-built in the structure of the society. They have historical roots and are perpetuated by the exclusion of the majority of the population from any significant participation in political life and in the benefits of economic development.

Basic human rights cannot be adequately protected in countries where structural violations are a permanent element of the society. Experience has shown that the restoration of formal democracy in countries previously under autocratic rule has generally put an end to political repression, but has not necessarily meant the restitution of the basic human rights for the majority of the population, especially the p[illegible], the minorities and the vulnerable groups. Structural obstacles are without doubt the most profound and difficult to overcome.

13. The obstacles to the realization of social, economic and cultural rights are numerous and of different nature. On the one hand, the theory and concepts included in the human rights instruments have evolved more rapidly than the practice. As the only prevailing instrument for 18 years, the Universal Declaration was widely accepted by the international community, but did not have the force of a treaty; the CSECR, which complemented it, did not have the force to create mechanisms and define obligations for the immediate realization of its provisions. As for the Declaration of the Right to Development, its overall goal is still a distant ideal, and has yet to become accepted by peoples and nations worldwide.

On the other hand, human rights advocates have not been able to convey the importance of these texts in defense of second and third generation rights to public opinion. The general debate has centered on violations of political and civil rights, while no one rang the alarm bell to warn against the worldwide deterioration of the principles of social justice, equity and solidarity.

Today, the rethorical question of whether economic and social rights can be enforced, has to be substituted by the political will and the determination of the international community, the governments and the civil society, to confront the priority task of achieving freedom from want for half of the world population.

II. POVERTY, MARGINALIZATION AND VIOLENCE

14. The definitions of poverty are many. They go from an economistic approach based on a classification below a certain threshold, to a more global tendency of defining poverty as the non-satisfaction of basic needs, or the inability to achieve a minimum standard of living.

Whatever the definition adopted, the shameful fact remains that more than 40 years after the Universal Declaration of human rights, freedom from want has only been achieved in industrialized countries by a majority of the population ; whereas hunger and poverty are still widespread in many areas in the South. The problem is massive in its economic and social dimension. In this last decade of the 20th century, about 1.4 billion people in developing countries live in absolute poverty (less than $370 a year), and another billion on the margin of poverty. They are poor not only in absolute terms, but also relative to the 23% of the world's population living in industrial countries who earn 85% of world's income.

How much poverty is there in the developing countries? (1985)

	Extremely poor		Poor		
Region	Number (millions)	Headcount (%)	Number (millions)	Headcount (%)	Poverty Gap
Sub-Saharan Africa	120	30	180	47	11
East Asia	120	9	280	20	1
China	80	8	210	20	3
South Asia	300	29	520	51	10
India	250	33	420	55	12
Eastern Europe	3	4	6	8	.5
Middle East and North Africa	40	21	60	31	2
Latin America and Caribbean	50	12	70	19	1
All developing	633	18	1116	33	3

Note: The poverty line in 1985 PPP dollars is $275 per capita a year for the extremely poor and $370 per capita a year for the poor. The headcount index is defined as the percentage of the population below the poverty line. The poverty gap is defined as the aggregate income shortfall of the poor as a percentage of aggregate consumption.
Source: UN document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/18, 27 June 1991

15. This report will focus on poverty in developing countries -the "poorest of the world poor", those whose economic and social rights have been neglected and who have been left out by the NIEO. The aim is to situate the problems in today's conjuncture, and analyse the endogenous and exogenous causes that affect the relation between human rights, development and democracy. We have relied on the macrodata provided by international development agencies in their annual reports (mainly UNDP and World Bank), as we do not have the capacity within the context of this report to make a in-depth study of the complex and multiform issue of poverty.

We have chosen to touch upon some general aspects of poverty, marginalization and violence from the human rights perspective.

a) Poverty and human rights

There are two sides of poverty to be stressed. On the one hand, according to international human rights instruments, the disrespect of economic and social rights is in itself a violation. On the other hand, poverty and marginalization create serious obstacles to the realization of political and civil rights, inasmuch as deprivation erodes solidarity links, and social and economic

marginalization lead to family and community desingration, loss of identity and self-esteem, thus making political participation more difficult.

b) The reduction of poverty

The reduction of poverty is essentially a political problem. Policies to reduce poverty involve a trade off between the interest of the poor and those of the non poor. The drive to eradicate poverty depends greatly on the cooperation of the non-poor, who usually detain the economic and political power. Governmennts will adopt such policies more easily in countries where the poor are organized and have a say in political and economic decisions.

c) The burden of poverty

Poverty is spread unevenly among regions and countries, and among the various members and groups within each community. In many countries, poverty is correlated to ethnic and race background; and in most, women and children suffer most from deprivation. Many of the poor live in the most ecologically vulnerable areas, and are particularly threatened by environmental hazards -pollution, poor sanitation, polluted waters and lack of basic services.

d) Cultural and educational barriers

The poor are often set apart by cultural and educational barriers. Illiteracy, lack of information, social status prevent their participation in the political and cultural life of a country.

e) Income disparities and the lifestyle issue

A minority of rich countries, which appropriates a large share of world resources, wants to maintain and enhance its standard of living whereas the developing world is striving to meet the basic needs of its people. Moreover, the spread of this lifestyle to the "modern sector" of developing nations has produced deep division within their societies. The result is a fundamental conflict of interests between rich and poor countries, between the small priviledged class and the large unorganized masses in developing countries. (Kothari, 1989: 137-8)

f) Marginalization of the poor in their access to social and economic benefits.

The poor have less access to publicly provided goods and infrastucture than other groups. On the whole, fewer public services are available to the poor, and governments fail in many instances to reach the rural poor and to devise policies that address the most vulnerable groups.

g) Impunity and violence

The neglect of the economic and social rights is a cause of social conflicts and violence. The Universal Declaration in its Preamble states that human rights should be protected by the rule of law, otherwise "rebellion against tyranny" will be the last resort left to man.

In many developing countries, including those that are formally democracies, the government does not respect its own laws, and impunity affects the equality of citizens before the law. The failure to enforce law not only perpetuates human rights abuses, but also makes it more difficult for governments to strengthen their legitimacy, institute social and economic reforms that could promote human development and make them acceptable to the citizens.

In the present day, rebellion against iniquity often takes the form of endemic violence, and rarely of organized movements for the revindications of civil rights. The increased marginalization and the lack of perspective of the most deprived section of the population, especially the unemployed and the young, makes them turn to violence and illegal activities.

Government agents continue to use illegal methods against the most destitute and defenceless portion of the population, such as torture in police precincts, killing of street children and youth without fear of being caught or punished, thus perpetuating the illegal circle of violence. The extremely high incidence of gross human rights violations even under constitutional rule indicates that these violations are covered by impunity.

Moreover, in many societies, the arbitrary power of the State can count with a widespread acquiescence of the population at large, even among the poor who although victim of this violence see it as a way of distancing themselves from the marginals and the criminals.

16. Poverty is associated with the denial of fundamental rights, as the poor are marginalized and unable to fight for themselves. Unlike the situation in the industrialized Western world where the workers were able to conquer their basic rights through their struggle and organization in trade unions and other social movements. In the present world conjuncture of recession, unemployment and social injustice, those who live on the margin of the system are powerless and have little political leverage to make themselves heard.

What is even more serious is that the poor are the preferential target of human rights violations in authoritarian regimes as well as in new democracies that are not able ensure freedoms and justice for all. In many of these countries, torture, inhuman and degrading treatment by government control agencies (police and prisons), arbitrariness of the judiciary system and widespread impunity, extra-judiciary execution by death squads or para-military forces, street children assassination, rural violence, etc. are still widespread practices, that generate endemic fear and insecurity amongst the most destitutes.

III. DEVELOPMENT: FROM ECONOMIC GROWTH TO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

EVOLUTION OF THE DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT

17. The realization of human rights cannot be dissociated from economic development and democracy. The interesting phenomenon is that the three concepts have evolved in the same direction, and that each of them explicitly includes the others in the assessment of its achievements.

In this respect, the evolution of development in recent years is most illustrative.

- In the 1950s and 1960s, many saw economic growth as the primary means of reducing poverty and improving the quality of life. Little attention was paid to political conditions. There was a widespread view that democracy was a luxury that poor countries could not afford, and that industrialization required strong (even authoritarian) state institutions to mobilize the resources necessary for growth.

-In the 1970s, attention shifted to public policies geared towards fostering the direct provision of health, nutritional and educational services. For many developing countries, especially in Latin America, high rates of economic growth were achieved, partly as a result of foreign borrowings. However, growth *per se* continued to be a priority and the benefits of growth were appropriated by an elite, while practically no thought was given to initiate basic structural changes involving a better distribution of resources among the population.

- Another shift in emphasis took place in the 1980s, as poor countries were strongly affected by the global recession and the debt crisis, especially countries in Latin America and Sub-Sahara Africa, which were forced to adopt drastic adjustment policies. Many began to question the validity of the social cost of these measures on deficit countries, and the disproportional hardship incurred by the most destitute and vulnerable sectors of the population. The 1980s where also marked by the liberal ideology, which believed that market forces would automatically bring along social reforms, and that public solutions to social problems were by definition bad.

- The 1990s have witnessed a return to public policies aimed at reducing poverty, and a consolidation of the newly emerging development concepts: human, equitable, sustainable became the new basic attributes of development. This trend was essential to reverse the discredit in which development models had fallen in developing countries. Not only were these often imposed models incompatible with the realization of human rights, but also their social costs were high as compared to their limited economic achievements -population displacement, disruption of traditional structures without offering new alternatives, social inequity and weakening of the working force.

18. UNDP has taken the lead in this new trend by consecrating the term "human development", defined as the process of enlarging the range of people's choice - increasing their opportunities for education, health care, income and employment, and covering the full range of human choices from a sound physical environment to economic and political freedoms.

19. Human freedom, a comprehensive concept that includes economic social and political rights, has become become a vital component of human development. Yet UNDP uses two indexes to measure human development and political freedom. The Human Development Index (HDI), which is an attempt to measure economic and

social rights; and the Political Freedom Index (PFI), which looks specifically at political and civil rights.

There are two reasons to keep them separately. First, they operate on different time scales: HDI is likely to be quite stable over time, whereas PFI can fluctuate very rapidly. Second, HDI partly depends on the countries' economic opportunities, while PFI does not. This treatment obviously reflects the concern of international human rights instruments to differentiate between freedoms, while at the same time, taking into consideration their interdependence and indivisibility.

20. We have chosen to look first into the factors that hinder the achievements of human development, both at the international and national level; and then to study the interaction of the two indexes and their effect on the realization of the basic freedoms.

A. THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

21. Our aim is to situate "the inalienable right to development" in the NIEO, to find out whether the States which "have the duty to cooperate in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development" are effectively fulfilling their duties so as to promote a "NIEO based on sovereign equality, interdependence, mutual interest and cooperation among all States." (article 3 of the Declaration of the Right to Development)

22. Despite the worldwide progress and the unprecedented economic growth realized by the technological revolutions of this century and the tremendous progress achieved by developing countries, the gains have not been evenly spread and the formidable problem of poverty persists.

In the following section, a general picture of the global situation will be drawn to show how the functioning of the international economic system has contributed to this situation of inequity, and to identify the conditions and obstacles to the realization of the right to development and of other human rights in developing countries.

a) Income gap and growth disparities

Globally, the income gap in the distribution of the world's GNP between rich and poor countries has increased dramatically in the last 30 years. The benefits of growth have been unevenly distributed between nations and people. Between 1960 and 1989, the countries with the richest 20% of world population grew 2.7 times faster than the bottom 20%. During these 30 years, the share of the least developed countries fell from 1% to 0.5 % of global GNP. The income gap between rich and poor countries is even starker than internal disparities (highest ratio 26 to 1), and continues to worsen.

Between 1960 and 1989, the countries with the richest 20% of world population increased their share of global GNP from 70.2% to 82.7% while the countries with the poorest 20% of the world population saw their share fall from 2.3% to 1.4%. This resulted in a doubling of the global income gap in 20 years. In 1960, the richest 20% of the world's population received 30 times more than the poorest 20%. In 1989, the ratio reached 60 to 1. If national disparities were to be taken into account, the inequality ratio for all people in the world would probably be over 150 to 1. (UNDP 1992).

The greater polarization between rich and poor countries occured in the 1980s, described as the lost decade to development. The real problem was that, although global income growth was on average higher than in the

former decade, global growth was poorly distributed. This process contributed to the marginalization of millions of people in poor countries.

b) Market disparities

Global markets fail to meet the needs of the world poorest nations and people. If global markets were truly open, they would allow capital, labour and goods to flow freely around the world. But global markets are neither free nor efficient. Developing countries enter them as unequal partners, with very limited negotiating power; and encounter difficulties of access because of protectionist trade barriers in those areas where they have a competitive edge, such as labour intensive manufactures and the export of unskilled labour. (UNDP, 1992)

The following examples illustrate the unequal access of developing countries to capital as well as goods and services markets. In the 1980s, real interest rates have been four times higher for poor nations than rich ones; the market for agricultural products has been distorted by import barriers and agricultural subsidies in industrial countries that reduced the export opportunities of poor countries. The share of international trade of the least developed countries has decreased from 0.8 to 0.4% in the past 20 years. (UNDP, 1992)

According to the UNDP's calculations, this structural inequality in the functioning of international markets costs developing countries US$500 billion annually -nearly 10 times the amount they receive in external aid.

c) Technological disparities

Technological innovation and increases in human productivity, which are considered the engine of economic progress, are precisely the areas where developing countries have been left behind by industrial countries. The technological gap has widened between North and South over the past 3 decades; whereas productivity has accounted for 50% of growth of economic output in industrial countries, the ratio in developing countries was 9%.

For poor countries to trade on a more equal basis, they will need to invest massively in people, basic social services as well as in "all levels of human capital formation -particularly in technical and managerial skills." (UNDP, 1992:41) Even so, these countries would have limited chances of competing with the production of industrialized countries that combine high technology with huge investments.

d) External debt and Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP)

The external debt of developing countries has multiplied thirteenfold in the last two decade: from $100 billion in 1970, to around $650 billion in 1980 and $1350 billion in 1990. The servicing of the external debt is extracting significant national resources from poor countries. Besides, the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) imposed by international agencies are penalizing debtor countries. The conditions are severe, obligating governments to reduce their public spending, which leads to cuts in investment, consumption and employment; this in turn means suffocating economic growth and significantly impacting human development as a result.

To give an idea of the magnitude of these capital outflows, between 1983 and 1989, creditors in wealthy countries received US$242 billion in transfers from long term debts from developing debtor countries. Besides, the IMF, created to maintain monetary stability and resolve balance of payment problems,

subtracted funds in an average of US$6.3 billion annually from developing countries in the late eighties.



In addition, the World Bank, rather than channelling funds to countries most in need, in 1990-91 took away US$1.7 billion from those countries. (UNDP, 1992)

Foreign debt constitutes one of the principal obstacles to growth in developing countries. We have calculated the correlation between debt, debt service capacity, and reserves, on the one hand, and GDP, per capita GNP, and GNP growth, on the other, based on the UNDP data. The results of our findings are that the countries, with the largest external debt and the lower capacity of repayment, have the smallest growth rates of GNP and of per capita GNP. On the other hand, there is a positive correlation between the level of monetary reserves of a country and the growth rate of its GNP (see item A -Appendix II).

These correlations, though weak in magnitude, corroborate UNDP's case studies findings that the external debt burden and the resulting SAP are hindering economic and social development in debtor nations.

23. To sum up, international economic factors have been adverse to developing countries. Overall economic growth has been unequally distributed to the detriment of poor countries; international markets have penalized weak partners and erected barriers against their competitive products. Moreover, the problem of the external debt that has reached dramatic proportions in the 1990s has affected the life of the poorest in terms of health, education, and infant mortality.

The vision according to which the mechanism of international trade, development finance and technology transfer would automatically transmit growth from the industrialized countries to developing countries proved to be unrealistic and erroneous. At the global level, the lack of regulatory mechanisms has set a pattern whereby

inequalities are reinforced and self-perpetuating. International disparities between rich and poor reached the ratio of 60 to 1; over a double of the highest ratio at national level - 26 to 1. Unless concerted measures to restructure the present IEO are taken jointly by rich and poor countries, the historical pattern of Northen command over world resources will continue to prevail to the systematic detriment of living standards in developing countries. (Kothary, 1989).

B. THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES IN NATIONAL ECONOMIES

24. The challenge of development is to improve the quality of life. This involves not only higher incomes, but also the reduction of poverty and greater equity, progress in education, health and nutrition, as well as a cleaner environment and greater political freedom. How do States ensure that "every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic , social, cultural and political development"? (art. 1 Declaration of the Right to Development)

At the national level, a human and sustained development in poor countries will depend on some basic conditions, and will require actions to be taken by the State to protect the basic economic and social rights of its population.

a) levels of income and economic growth

Our first question is to know how the level of income affects the social indicators in a given country, and if economic growth improves the quality of life.
We have found strong and positive correlations between income levels and various social indicators. Substantively, these coefficients suggest that:

- The greater a country's GNP or GDP, the higher the human development index - keeping in mind, however, that GNP per capita is one of the components of the HDI, which may inflate the result;
- The greater a country's GNP or GDP, the greater the access of the population to health services and potable water, infant immunization rate, life expectancy, daily calorie supply, and literacy rate; and the lower the infant mortality rate and the population growth rate; (see item B Appendix II)

Correlations between growth rates and changes in the human development indicator (HDI) in the period between 1970 and 1990 corroborate these results. Many of the countries with low HDI values also had low or negative GDP growth rates during the period in question. (UNDP, 1992, 95)

The conclusion drawn is that economic growth is a vital component of development, but it is not sufficient in itself to ensure an equitable distribution of the social and economic benefits. [2]

b) distribution of income and resources

The answer to large divergences between levels of income and human development rests primarily with the distribution of resources within the

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[2] To illustrate the fact that high income levels do not automatically translate into high levels of human development, we have applied a regression analysis to 160 countries between GNP per capita (as an economic indicator) and life expectancy (as a social indicator). The analysis of the standardized residuals shows that a high GNP per capita is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a country to have a high life expectancy. (see item C in appendix II).
The relation between economic and human development is a two-way street. Just as an economically developed country is better able to feed and educate its population, a healthy and educated population is better able to contribute to a country's economic development. Country studies conducted by the UNDP attest to the fact that education is one of the most effective investments a country can make, increasing human productivity, contributing to accelerate economic development, and promoting a more equitable income distribution. Data correlations suggest that there is a strong connection between public expenditures on health and education and GNP and GDP. The question is: do countries invest more in health and education because they have greater financial resources, or do they have greater financial resources because they have invested in the health and education of their populations? Both assertions are probably correct.

society: income, land, credit, social services and employment opportunities. When calculated per capita, the GNP hides disparities in the country's internal income distribution.

We have used the Index of Power Resources (IPR),[3] an indicator to measure the distribution of intellectual and economic resources within a given society, constructed by the political scientist Tatu Vanhanen, to establish correlations with various social indicators. The results showed that the higher the IPR, the higher the HDI (r=.6833), life expectancy (r=.6833), access to potable water (r=.5242) and health services (r=.5156), and the lowest the population growth rate (r=-.6694).

These correlations show that the internal distribution of intellectual and economic wealth (IPR) decisively affect the living conditions of the population. Besides, a strong correlation also exists between IPR and income level: the higher the income level, the greater the distribution of intellectual and economic resources. (see R Pearson Coefficient in note [4])

The progress of human development and the improvement in the living conditions of the population depend more on the equitable distribution of wealth than on the level of absolute wealth.

c) Government regulatory action

At the national level, external limitations on economic growth can be counterbalanced by government intervention in the areas where markets cannot be relied upon. The regulatory government action means investing in education, health, nutrition, poverty alleviation; mobilizing resources to finance public expenditure; and providing a stable economic foundation.

One of the best means to internally redistribute income/wealth is government investment in social areas. In addition to improvements in growth and distribution, such investments revert in the quality of life of the population. The more a country invests in education and in health, the higher the HDI and the life expectancy of its population.

However, in order to undertake such investments, governments need to mobilize resources to finance public expenditure. This requires the political will to undertake such reforms and the political capacity to implement them, as these reforms will necessarily be done at the expense of some vested interests. Policies to alleviate poverty impose costs to the non poor, who usually exert strong influence on policies. In this respect, an increase of public investment in the human capital of the poor is often more acceptable than a redistribution of existing assets (land reform). This is especially true in countries where wealth is concentrated in a small "modern sector" coexisting with a majority of poor.

Difficulties in government intervention are well illustrated in Latin America, which constitute the most striking case of contrast between wealth and

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[3] Index of power resources (IPR): Tatu Vanhanen, 1991. Created to attempt to measure the dispersion of political resources. A composite indicator composed of: *percentage of urban population, percentage of nonagricultural population, number of students in universities and other degree-granting institutions, literacy rate, share of family farms* and the *degree of decentralization of nonagricultural economic resources*

[4] Correlations: IPR (Index of Power Resources - see appendix I for definitions)

GNP/CAPITA	.8237			GDP/CAPITA	.8391
Cases	(145)		Cases	(131)	
Significance	P= .000			Significance	P= .000

(Coefficient / (Cases) / 1-tailed Significance)

poverty in the developing world. Despite the fact that average incomes are 5 or 6 times those of South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, one-fifth of the population still lives in poverty, because of the extreme inequality in income distribution. According to the World Bank estimation, raising all the poor in the continent above the poverty line would require a commitment of investing in social programs about 0.7% of regional GDP or 2% income taxes on the wealthiest fifth of the population.

Yet, no government in the region has undertaken such a program. The reasons are multiple: they go from economic and conjunctural factors, such as heavy debt burden, incapacity to impose stabilization policies by reducing inflationary public deficit; to social and political obstacles, such as the lack of political leverage and the lack of political commitment. Moreover, redistributive measures which were not undertaken in periods of economic growth are much more difficult to implement in times of crisis. As we know, the years of the "economic miracle" in Latin America were followed by the "lost decade" of the eighties.

Another factor hindering governments' actions in poor countries in general, is that they are faced with the impossible task of combating poverty and adjusting their economies at a time of global recession and of adverse international conjuncture.

To sum up, in many countries, problems of human neglect are less due to lack of financial resources than to lack of political commitment. The investment of a small percentage of their GNP in social priorities would, in many situations, be sufficient to restructure public budgets. In other countries, the economic factors are predominant. However, in almost all cases, to be successful, public expenditures in social areas will h. . to be combined with policies to obtain other financial resources such as detaining the outflow of capital, combating corruption and tax evasion, reducing military expenditures, grandiose public works programs, and reduce budget deficit.

d) Political Freedom

Besides the above mentioned economic factors - economic growth, resource distribution and social investments, political and civil rights constitute vital components of human development .

History shows that improvements of the social and economic welfare of the majority of the population in developed countries was made possible largely because the working class, the trade unions and other social and political movements could organize and make demands of their governments, through legislative and political channels and democratically elected assemblies. (*Skogly, 1991, 29*) In nations which enjoy political and civil liberties, the population is in a better position to demand that the benefits of economic growth be translated into improvements in the quality of life for all.

On the basis of data collected for 104 countries representing 92% of the world's population, UNDP drew some tentative conclusions as regards the distribution of freedom and the link between political freedom and human development:

- of these countries, about a third had high freedom (a 75% score or above), another third had reasonable freedom (50-75%), and the remaining third modest to low freedom (50% or less).
- political freedom and human development seemed to move in tandem. Countries with a high HDI (Human Development Index)

have an average PFI (Political Freedom Index) of 84%, while countries with a low HDI have an average PFI of 48%. [5]

25. Many Third World countries are still hiding behind the pseudo-issue of freedom versus development to justify their curbing of political freedom in the name of political progress. Other countries that have formally adopted democratic institutions have been unable to extend these rights for all.

The enjoyment of political and civil rights by the poor and the marginalized groups will have to be slowly conquered with the help of the organized society, namely the national and international NGOs and social movements; and with the support of the international community, through the various UN agencies.

26. In short, as we have seen, the three economic factors -economic development, the internal income distribution of material and intellectual resources, government regulatory action through inter alia investment in areas of social priorities such as health and education- combined with the political element of civil and political liberties are important factors which influence the level of human development within a given country.

With a few exceptions, these factors have not been propitious to human development in developing countries. Their growth rates have been low in absolute and relative terms ; the perverse development models adopted were biased to benefit a small minority; the governments' role as the ultimate guarantor of economic and social rights for all has been restricted because of the scarcity of resources and/or the political will and capacity to implement them for the majority of the population at the expense, at least in the short run, of existing vested interests.

Moreover, political freedoms, which move in tandem with human development, are in fact also restricted to the minority of non poor. As we have seen, the poor have difficulties of acceeding fully to these rights, and are particularly vulnerable to human rights abuses.

For all these reasons, the right to a human development is still being challenged by adverse conditions on the national and international level.

IV. DEMOCRACY: INCOME LEVELS, RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION AND STRUCTURAL HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

27. This section studies the relation between income level, resource distribution,human rights and democracy. Our starting point is to look into the relation between these two economic factors and human rights violations, it being understood that democracy cannot reach its full expression with the prevalence of extended human rights violations.

A. LEVELS OF INCOME, RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION AND GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (GHRV)

There is an association between the level of human rights violations and income level within a given society. In general, the richer the country, the less the probability that citizens rights will be violated. Several factors contribute to the

[5] However, it should be noted that if we wanted to establish a relation of causality between human development and human freedom, we would not be able to determine which of them is the independent variable. Does a high HFI facilitate human development or does a high level of human development facilitate the achievement of a high HFI? Considering specifically the literacy rate, it is possible to assume that the population of a nation with a high educational level will have greater awareness of its civil and political rights. It can also be assumed that in a society which enjoys freedom of speech, press and association, the level of education of the population will be greater. Again, there is undoubtedly a certain degree of feedback between the two variables.

respect of human rights in rich countries: the struggle for survival is less accute, education and the conscience of rights is greater and more widespread, and the control of society over the repressive State apparatuses is more effective. However, what makes the association between income level and the rate of human rights violations especially significant, is the fact that income distribution is much more egalitarian in most rich developed countries.

It would thus seem that the determinant causal factor in relation to the level of human rights violations is resource distribution, rather than income level in itself; a conclusion corroborated by Vanhannen's findings about the relationship between levels of political democracy and of economic development (see above).

Another aspect that must be stressed is that the association between wealth and human rights violations is not always linear. That is to say, that in intermediary income level countries, the level of human rights violations can be relatively higher than in the two other categories. (low and high income countries)

28. A study, carried out by Mitchell and McCormick, examines the relation between economic development and human rights, using information provided by Amnesty International on human rights violations in 1984. Its conclusion are:

- The wealthier the country, the less likely it is to hold a large number of political prisoners.
- countries that have a relatively low per capita income are more likely to have higher levels of torture." (Mitchell and McCormick, 1987, 488)

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
BY LEVEL OF INCOME



Source: Figures from Mitchell and McCormick, 1988, based on Amnesty International data for 1984, for the human rights violations category "very often".

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

	Per Capita Income		
	$0-500	$501-3000	> $3000
	A. Political Prisioners Taken		
Rarely or never	2,4	11,3	35,7
Sometimes	41,5	26,4	32,1
Often	34,1	35,8	21,4
Very Often	22,0	26,4	10,7
Total	100,0 (n=41)	99,9 (n=53)	99,9 (n=28)

Chi Square = 18.70, p <.005

	B. Use of Torture		
Rarely or never	29,3	28,3	60,7
Sometimes	29,3	22,6	28,6
Often	22,0	30,2	7,1
Very Often	19,5	18,9	3,6
Total	100,1 (n=41)	100,0 (n=53)	100,0 (n=28)

Chi Square = 14.36, p < .03

Source: Mitchell and McCormick, 1988

As we can see from the above graphic and tables, although in absolute terms torture and political prisons are more frequent in low income countries, they are relatively more widespread in middle income countries, and only diminish in high income countries.

29. Another study carried out by the UNDP reached similar conclusions by using an index to measure political freedom (PFI), based on 5 criteria: physical integrity of the individual, rule of law, freedom of expression, political participation and equality of opportunity.

Political Freedom Index	Income Level		
	High	Middle	Low
Personal integrity	8.7	5.8	4.0
Rule of law	8.6	5.8	4.2
Freedom of speech	8.3	6.0	4.3
Political particip.	8.7	6.3	3.4
Equality of opportunity	7.6	6.4	5.5
PFI	83.7	60.8	42.8

One of its findings is that there appears to be a link between a country's per capita income and the extent of its democratic freedoms. For high-income countries, the average PFI is 84%, for middle-income countries 61%, and for low-income countries 43%.

30. Using more recent data and a different income level subdivision of countries , similar findings were made by correlating GNP per capita in 1990 and the variable *Democracy* [6]:

- none of the high income countries falls into the category of "widespread and frequent violations of human rights";
- of the 22 high income countries, 17 fall into the categories "some violations" and "no violations";
- none of the low income countries falls into the category "no significant violations of human rights" and only one into the category "some violations";

[6] The levels are: high = over US$6000; middle = US$500-US$6000; low = less than US$500 / *Democracy* is a variable generated by Pourgerami on the basis of the Political Repression Index constructed by Berg-Schlosser.

- of the 28 low income countries, 27 fall into the categories of "major, serious, or widespread violations of human rights".
- of the 42 middle income countries, 34 fall into "major, serious, or widespread violations of human rights". It is interesting to note that both "widespread" and "serious violations" categories, are proportionally higher in middle than in low income countries.
-the gamma coefficient presents a negative signal,implying an inverted relation between income level and violations.

Crosstabulation: LEVEL OF INCOME
By DEMOCRACY: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Count / -> Col Pct	WIDESP. VIOL.	SERIOUS VIOL.	MAJOR VIOL.	SOME VIOL.	NO SIGNI FICANT	Row Total
HIGH INCOME		3 13.6	2 8.3	2 25.0	15 83.3	22 23.9
MIDDLE INCOME	15 75.0	10 45.5	9 37.5	5 62.5	3 16.7	42 45.7
LOW INCOME	5 25.0	9 40.9	13 54.2	1 12.5		28 30.4
Column Total	20 21.7	22 23.9	24 26.1	8 8.7	18 19.6	92 100.0

Chi-Square	D.F.	Significance	Min E.F.	Cells with E.F.< 5
54.45641	8	.0000	1.913	5 OF 15 (33.3%)

Statistic	Value
Contingency Coefficient	.60978
Gamma	-.[illegible]91

Source: Pourgerami, 1988 and UNDP, 1991

31. The passage from a low to a middle income level has been accompanied in many countries by an increase in human rights violations, which led many to believe that rapid economic growth was incompatible with political liberties. However, this view is widely contested today as other factors play an important role in establishing this relation. One of the most important factors is the rate of resource distribution within a society.

Crosstabulation: IPR - INDEX OF POWER RESOURCES
By DEMOCRACY: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

DEMOCRAC-> Count / Row Pct	WIDESP. VIOL.	SERIOUS VIOL.	MAJOR VIOL.	SOME VIOL.	NO SIGNI FICANT	Row Total
IPR						
High Concentred Power Resources	7 22.6	10 32.3	13 41.9	1 3.2		31 33.7
Middle Concentred Power Resources	4 23.5	6 35.3	7 41.2			17 18.5
Low Concentred Power Resources	9 20.5	6 13.6	4 9.1	7 15.9	18 40.9	44 47.8
Column Total	20 21.7	22 23.9	24 26.1	8 8.7	18 19.6	92 100.0

Chi-Square	D.F.	Significance	Min E.F.	Cells with E.F.< 5
37.99036	8	.0000	1.478	7 OF 15 (46.7%)

Statistic	Value	Significance
Contingency Coefficient	.54061	
Gamma	.40312	

Source: Pourgerami, 1988 and Vanhanen, 1990

Correlating the same variable Democracy with Vanhannen's Index of Power Resources, we find that:

-among 31 countries with a high level of concentration of economic , political and cultural resources, 30 are in the categories major, serious or widespread human rights violations.
-among 44 countries with low concentration of resources, 25 are included in the categories of some or no signficant human rights violations
- the gamma coefficient presents a positive signal , meaning a direct relation between distribution and violations

In other words, economic growth in the first stages of development does not necessarily mean more human rights violations. As the latter are associated with the level of resource distribution in society, an alternative development model which could distribute growth benefits to all sectors of the population would contribute to diminish political instability.

32. The data reveals an unequivocal association between a country's income level, its resources distribution and its degree of respect for human rights. The struggle for scarce resources and use of repression to control discontent with inequality in resource distribution, increase the level of confrontation and repression. This helps explain why human rights violations continue in recently democratized nations.

In fact, many of the human rights violations could be drastically diminished through political reforms and better control over repressive apparatuses. However this is only feasible in countries that do not have an excessively unjust income distribution.

B. INCOME LEVELS, RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION AND DEMOCRATIZATION

33. The number of democracies in the world has increased continually since the last century and at the current time almost half of the countries in the world are ruled by popularly elected governments. A comparative study of 147 countries between 1980 and 1988, shows the following classification:



SOURCE: T. VANHANEN

The number of democracies has increase from 48 to 61 in the 9 year time period in question, while the number of semi-democracies decreased from 7 to 5, and the number of non-democratic States from 92 to 81. (see above graph)

Several studies have empirically tested the hypothesis of the relation between economic development and democratization, and their results indicate that there is a moderately positive correlation between democracy and economic development. However, other influential factors are also pointed out.

For instance, if we use Vanhanen's Index of Democratization[7] as an indicator of democratization and the GNP per capita and real GDP as indicators of economic development, we find strong and positive correlations of .6521 and .6747, respectively. Yet, according to Vanhanen, "it is not sure that this relationship has been caused by economic developments or modernization per se; it may have been caused by something else than economic development indicates." This something else is precisely the degree of concentration of economic, intellectual and political resources in the population. (Vanhanen, 1990, 41) In more precise terms, Vanhanen maintains that:

> i) "The relative distribution of economic, intellectual, and other power resources among various sections of the population is the fundamental factor that accounts for the variation of democratization.
> ii) Democratization will take place under conditions in which power resources have become so widely distributed that no group is any longer able to suppress its competitors or to maintain its hegemony." (Vanhanen, 1990, 50)

In fact, analysis of the standardized residuals of the regression analysis between GNP and ID suggests that some countries have a much higher degree of

[7] A composite of two indicators: participation (based on the percentage of the population voting in presidential and/or parliamentary elections) and competition (based on the smaller parties' share of votes cast in parliamentary and/or presidential elections) See apenddix for details

democratization than their GNP per capita would suggest, while others, on the contrary, are less democratic than their GNP per capita would indicate (see item D in appendix II) Though some countries are included in the "deviant" category due to their extremely high or low GNP per capita, the analysis indicates that the relation between economic growth and democracy is not always linear, and that a country can be democratic without having many resources, or non-democratic in spite of an abundance of economic resources. The concentration of economic, intellectual and political resources could explain this non-linearity between economic growth and democracy.

34. A positive correlation between development and democracy has been questioned by various studies [8] which subscribe to the incompatibility between the democratic character of political institutions and rapid economic growth." (Pourgerami, 1988, 124)

The complexity of the relation between the two phenomena is pointed out in one of these studies by Samuel Huntington. The political instability that resulted in the breakdown of democracy in a good part of the developing world was generated precisely by rapid economic growth and the resulting rapid social changes, in contrast with the low level of institutionalization of the political system. In countries passing through a rapid phase of development, "the rates of social mobilization and expansion of political participation are high; the rates of political organization and institutionalization are low. The result is political instability and disorder. The fundamental policy problem is the delay in the development of political institutions in relation to social and economic change." (Huntington 1968, 17) Huntington alerts to the necessity of incorporating the whole population in the benefits of growth, to avoid escalating the struggle for scarce and concentrated resources.

35. Another interpretation by Vanhanen goes further and show that, in Western Europe and North America, the association between high levels of national wealth and democracy is caused mainly by the fact that high levels of socioeconomic development are connected with broad-based distribution of economic and intellectual resources among the population. Thus, the distribution of resources would appear to be the true causal factor in the relation between development and democracy.

36. *Contrary to the widespread view which maintains that a fairly high level of national wealth is necessary to foster democracy, Vanhanen's ideas offer a degree of hope for poor nations. "Very few developing countries have realistic chances to achieve the level of national wealth in contemporary Western Europe and North America, whereas it would be much easier to create favorable conditions for democracy by furthering the distribution of intellectual and economic power resources. On the basis of my theory, the prospects of democracy are not so bleak for poor countries. It is possible even for relatively poor countries, as empirical evidence shows, to establish and maintain democratic institutions, if relevant power resources are distributed widely enough." (Vanhanen, 1990, 167, 195)*

Vanhanen's proposal is indeed an attractive solution for developing countries; however, its realization will require to overcome obstacles the decisive commitment of the state and the support of the non poor. A more in-depth study would be needed to understand why authoritarian practices persist in many developing countries during the democratic transional period.

C. DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS AND STRUCTURAL HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

37. In many societies, on all continents, the relations between government and society during the second half of the twentieth century has been characterized by

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[8] Heilbroner (1963), Bhagwati (1966), Andreski (1969), Emerson (1971), Flanigan and Fogelman (1971), Huntington and Nelson (1976), Burton (1977), Kann (1979), Franz and Webb (1977), and Lipton (1977).

illegality and arbitrary power, to which the majority of the population has been forced to submit. When these societies experienced transitions to democratic regimes, mostly in the 1980s, authoritarian practices were not necessarily affected by political changes and by free and competitive elections. This is especially true in Latin American middle-income countries where economic changes have not been accompanied by institutional and social changes.

38. The question posed by Latin American scholars is whether basic political and civil rights can be adequately protected in countries where "structural violations" of the economic, social and cultural rights seem to be a permanent feature of the society. (Stavenhagen, 1990) Among the factors that can lead to gross human rights violations and systemic violations, inequality in its various forms, as we have demonstrated, can be considered one of the most devastating: inequality of income, of control over resources and of treatment before the law. (Schmid, 1989) Therefore, in societies where there is a great hierarchical stratification, there is also a great likelihood that government will commit more human rights violations in spite of democratic rule. (Gurr, cit. Schmid, 1989: 30)

39. Democracy cannot be stable if the majority of the population does not have the basic necessities of life and hve no hope for improvement in the near future. Despite democratic forms of government, many constitutional regimes throughout the world continue to tolerate "areas of terror" directed against ethnic, economic or other unpopular minorities. Although the State theoretically has the monopoly of physical violence in society, in many developing contries illegal violence continues to be the rule, not the exception. Many states retain high levels of violence, mostly illegal, in which institutions such as torture and extra- legal executions continue to prevail. (Friedrich, 1972: 28 and 236; Pinheir[illegible] 1992)

40. If we consider democracy, in spite of its shortcomings in the early phases, to be the nearest thing we have to guarantee human rights, it is important to find means of consolidating its institutions. A government cannot claim that it is democratic merely because periodic elections are held, however, it cannot be denied that free, competitive and periodic elections make the government accountable for its actions to the electorate. In a democratic context, the accountability of State agents may be increased, making it possible for the crimes of State agents to be investigated and punished, thus correcting human rights violations over time. Democracy is a precondition for the achievement of social and economic rights, which in turn can contribute to the fight against political and civil human rights violations. Democratic principles and institutions have a great potential of inhibition on government illegal actions, as well as on the attitude of political elites in regard to abuses.

41. The big challenge facing new democracies consists in consolidating their in[illegible]tutions, and turn them from limited or restricted democracies to full democracies. The structural violations in-built in the economic and social structures of a country are as destructive to democratic principles as the well known political and civil rights violations. The big difference between the two types of violations is that the former cannot be solved by the state alone, the whole society has to be involved in the proposed changes.

42. Up to recently, neither human rights organizations nor international agencies had really undertaken a full evaluation of the consequences of these structural violations. Human rights entities have tended to focus on political and civil rights violations, and to relegate social and economic violations to development organizations.

It is however important to point out the emergence of a new type of social movements, which embrace the cause of the poor, the marginalized, the migrant families, the racial minorities, the indigeneous people, the landless peasants. These movements are especially active in a number of countries in Latin American and Asia (Stavenhagen, 1990; Kothary, 1990). Their fight for human dignity, equality and

the fulfillment of the basic necessities of their members go beyond the range of activities of the debilitaded political parties and the weakened trade unions.

The diversity of these movements and the dynamism of their causes represent a hope for newly established democracies. Yet, one should not underestimate the obstacles to their activities, that can go from bureaucratic inertia to open conflicts with government authorities and those in favour of the status quo. This is why it is imperative for the national and international communities to recognize the role of the social movements in the democratization process, to foster the strengthening of their structure and to favour the creation of networks at national, regional and international level.

43. In smmmary, economic growth is imperative for the stabilization of new democracies. However, growth in itself is not enough. In the future, more attention must be given to the distribution of economic growth and resources, and to the necessity of undertaking profound changes in the socio-economic structure, as well as in the political system. Without a concerted effort, by the State together with all sections of the population, to eliminate the worst forms of human misery, neither an end to authoritarianism nor the existence of democratic institutions will by themselves guarantee the economic and social rights of the poor. (Stavenhagen, 1990)

44. It seems clear, therefore, that neither extracting resources from developing societies nor preventing their entry in the international market will promote human development and democracy. Many new democracies are experiencing serious economic difficulties, and the flight of resources out of their countries only worsens their chances of survival. The memory of authoritarian regimes, which often coincided with periods of prosperity, is still fresh, and if these young democracies fail to obtain better living conditions for their population, their democratic systems will also lose legitimacy.

V. THE DISTRIBUTION OF WORLD ECONOMIC GROWTH : A QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

45. In a world becoming ever more connected and interdependent through international trade, communications, and technology, international cooperation is no longer an option (or an alternative to nationalism), it is a necessity. There is more than ever a consensus that a world safe from military threats, with a sane environment and free from drugs and epidemics, requires the concerted efforts of all nations. A number of indivisible public goods cannot be achieved by unilateral actions of people or nations. As we know, many of the problems affecting the security and the health of the Planet are linked to the level of economic development of its inhabitants; "it should never be forgotten that poverty needs no passport to travel across international frontiers -- in the form of migration, environmental degradation, drugs, disease and political instability." (UNDP, 1992: 6).

46. An analysis of variance, used to discover the statistical differences between averages, reveals that the level of economic development of a country significantly affects, all variables -the level of democratization, of health and of population growth, with the exception of military spending.

Variables	Income Level			
	High	Middle	Low	F *
Index of Democratization (ID1988)	270.8	97.0	21.7	51.8
Military Expenditures (GSTMILSE)	40.7	75.8	85.1	2.0**
Imunization rate (IMUNIZ)	86.4	80.1	65.3	12.1
Population Growth (CREPOPUL)	0.9	2.1	2.8	34.9
Acess to Health Services (ACESAUDE)	98.2	76.5	55.8	19.7

* Under the null hypothesis, we would expect values for F to be close to 1
** not significant
*** sources: UNDP 1991,92 and Vanhanen, 1990

Considering each of the variables, the importance of a global concerted action appears more clearly:

- The lower the income level of a country, the lower the Vanhanen Index of Democratization (ID1988). If, as historians assert, it is true that democratic nations rarely go to war with each other, then a world in which resources are more equitably distributed and democracy more solid will, without doubt, be a world much less threatened by war than the present one.

- In addition, high population growth rates are precisely to be found in poor countries, many of which are facing alarming rates of unemployment. The illegal migratory flow in search of better opportunities in the first world will also increase with the deepening of the third world crisis . Some 38 million people join the labour force every year in the South, added to the 700 million already unemployed or underemployed. If the opportunities do not go to the people, the people end up "going to" the opportunities.

- The invasions of refugees fleeing from Third World wars, internal conflicts and misery, is today one of the greastest challenges faced by the governments of developed countries, contributing to destabilization and chauvinism. The great majority of these refugees, coming from Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America, victims of the breakdown of communist regimes, of ethnic and religious wars, of hunger, poverty and authoritarian regimes, try to

enter the developed countries applying for political asylum; although most of them are not political refugees but simply want to escape hunger and live as human beings.

- Another grave threat to current democracies, especially in Latin America, is the growth in drug trafficking. Organized crime related to drugs has become in many countries a parallel state within the State, threatening not only the institutions but the very values of society. The struggle against this growing phenomenon is a struggle to defend national and international security.

- AIDS, which is taking epidemic proportions in poor countries, reminds us that no one is immune to infectious diseases and epidemics which can easily spread across continents.

47. As proposed by the authors of the UNDP HDR-92, "all countries will need to come together in joint action programs to combat some of the most serious global problems - including poverty, hunger, illiteracy, drug trafficking and abuse, nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, illegal immigration, the depletion of non-renewable resources. This must be based on a recognition that the world cannot be made safe without the full collaboration of all - rich and poor, north and south. Only through cooperation can the world achieve sustainable human development." (UNDP, 1992: 90)

VI. CREATING CONDITIONS FOR THE FULL REALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

AN AGENDA 21 FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY

48.The evergrowing dimension of poverty worldwide and the increasing disparities between North and South, rich and poor, is endangering the ethical foundation of our Planet and penalizing the future of coming generations.

One person in four lives in absolute poverty and nearly half of humanity at the margin of poverty. The polarization between rich and poor countries has taken dramatic proportions, as the inequality ratio has more than doubled in the last 30 years. This situation is jeopardizing the democratization process, questioning the development models and threatening international security.

Poverty can no more be seen as a fatality in a world that has the means to alleviate the suffering and attend the needs of hundreds of millions of innocents victims, women, men and children.

49. Poverty, described as the lack of satisfaction of basic human needs, is a human right violation . But it is also, at the same time, an economic problem linked to national and international development policies, and a social and political issue that has to do with entitlements of liberties and freedoms, popular participation, and above all democracy. The three dimensions, human rights, development and democracy are closely interrelated, and have to be considered when dealing with economic, social and cultural rights. Unidimensional approaches to issues related to these rights would be incomplete, biased and little effective.

50. This is why our proposal for the World Conference is the creation of an AGENDA 21 FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY. This Agenda would encompass the various aspects of human rights -economic, political, social, cultural and civil, reflect all major revindictions by movements and groups -racial minorities, migrants and refugees, indigeneous people, women's rights, etc; and involve the international community, the governmental and non-governmental entities and the society at large.

We are aware that it is an ambitious proposal that will require time for discussion and elaboration, but we are also convinced that the advantages and benefits for all involved could be tremendous.

51. Focusing mainly on the economic, social and cultural rights, a few of these aspects can be spelled out:

The debate in turn of these rights will:
. raise awareness as regard the magnitude of the poverty problem and of its consequences; and pressure national and international entities to take action;
. give a wider diffusion to the ideas and contents of international human rights instruments;
. make an unambiguous statement to the recognition of these rights as human rights;
. contribute to build a consensus that development can more be reduced to economic growth, and that equitable, human and sustainable are the prerequisites attributes of any development model; and that human rights are an integral part of the process.
. undo the myth that rapid economic growth in poor countries is incompatible with human rights.

A. INTERNATIONAL COMPACT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

52. Recent and current examples of international cooperation suggest that the time for international efforts to deal with the important issues of equity and justice at the global level has come. The philosopher Norberto Bobbio calls our attention to the rebirth of contractualist doctrines, motivaded by the idea of a founding contract for a global society, distinct from partial societies. Different from previous contractualist doctrines, the current doctrines are introducing, among the conditions of the new alliance, mechanisms which deal with issues of justice.

53. In its 1992 Human Development Report, UNDP proposed a New Global Compact for Development, to create "a new world order: an order based on mutual respect between nations, on greater equality of opportunity for the world's people and on new structures for international peace and security." (UNDP-HDR 92, 197). This initiative is indeed a vital first step towards concerted action in the field of human development.

54. Focusing on the specific problem of poverty, we would like to go a step further, by suggesting a compact based on necessity, and not only on the goodwill of states. Our postulate is that international security, as an indivisible international public good, must be preserved for the welfare of all, and that one of the elements that is threatening international stability is the magnitude of the poverty problem. As market forces cannot be relied upon to guarantee this stability, concerted efforts should be undertaken by poor and rich countries, to eradicate poverty.

For this reason, the adoption of pro-development measures cannot be considered as an act of paternalism or pure altruism, but a vital necessity to promote peace and justice in the world. As in the case of national security, international security requires collective action towards a common interest. Unfortunately, the common interest is rarely achieved spontaneously by individual action in pursuit of individual interests, thus creating the need to reach a compact that would translate this global concern into an agenda of concrete intervention, the nearest possible thing to a global welfare state.

At this juncture, we are faced with the classic collective action problem known as "prisoner's dilemma". The preferred option for all is concerted action, the preferred option for each individual country is no action. The creation of a new global compact for development could prove to be an alternative to overcome this dilemma.

55. This compact should not be limited to strictly economic issues. It should encompass cultural, technological and ethical aspects. The wasteful lifestyle by industrial countries cannot be sustained on a global level, and not even anymore on national level. Industrial countries are suffering from growing income disparities within their own societies, as well as growing unemployment and poverty, with the consequent rebirth of xenophobic and racist outburst of violence. Out of the necessity for a better global world an alternative development pattern should emerge, that will not increase polarization between countries, nor associate economic growth with gross human rights violations.

B - NATIONAL COMPACT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

56. State and society must jointly struggle for a better world for all and progress on a global scale.

a) Role of the State

Governments have the primary responsibility of alleviating poverty and ensuring progress in the human development of its people. As regards HR, the role of the State is to respect, to protect and to promote their effective realization. This function of the State is double-faced: on the one hand, as bearer of the monopoly of legal violence, the State has to put limitations on

its powers and actions; and on the other hand, as guardian of public order, it must be the protector and provider of all liberties.

The poor are today the most vulnerable "minority" in every society, although being a majority in most. They are "institutionally excluded and systematically discriminated against" in societies governed by laws that are not applied and markets that exclude them (UN, 1991). Whereas the responsibility of the State is clear-cut and immediate in the case of political and civil rights, the determination of its responsibility in the case of economic, social and cultural rights lacks definition and precise obligations. It is therefore imperative for the States to create systems of governments that institutionalize the protection of HR. In the fullfilment of its obligations, the guiding principle must be equity. Government of developing countries should:

Respect of HR:
- to implement the provisions of the main international instruments;
- to adopt public policies in favour of the poor, and make sure that social services reach them;
- to respect the political and social rights of the poor without discrimination of race, religion, gender, region, ethnic group; and to allow their access to the benefits of development;

Protection of HR:
- to ensure the access of the poor to justice;
- to protect the rights of the poor against economic exploitation on the part of the non poor;
- to protect the poor against violence and HR abuses on the part of its own apparatuses;
- to eliminate corruption in public administration;

Promotion of HR:
- to launch of a decisive campaign in favour of the eradication of poverty and against inequity, corruption, and discrimination against marginalized and destitute groups;
- to gain the support of the entire society in this campaign;
- to strengthen democratic institutions and increase popular participation
- to create networks of solidarity regionally and internationally;

The failure of the state to ensure its most basic obligation - to ensure the human rights of its citizens - is in itself a negation of modernity and progress. No country can acceed to full democracy and promote human development without fullfilling this obligation.

b) Role of civil society

The societies of developing countries are internally divided into a modern sector and a peripheric sector, formerly called traditional sector. This is no more the case given that, in many countries, the poor have been marginalized and in the process lost their culture and identity. The big challenge of today's developing countries is to rebuilt the bridge between those who participate and the "losers".

NGOs and human rights entities have played a vital role to defend victims of autocratic regimes on all continents, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, and continue to do so in countries that are still using authoritarian practices against its opponents. Their struggle against human right abuses of political and civil rights has been and continues to be courageous, well targeted,

efficient and in many cases successful. Their actions have been, in many instances, supported by the mobilization of the society and the existence of a network of support to the cause at regional and international level.

In comparison, the present fight against poverty is, at the same time, wider and less precise. The group of victims, the poor, cannot be as easily defined as is the case of political opponents or dissident minorities. Their number is infinitely higher, and their profile much more difficult to draw as they do not constitute a homogenous group. Their rights are also more difficult to defend as it lacks the support of the public opinion, as the poor are seen by many as "les classes dangereuses". Civil society has in many instances kept out of this struggle. The small educated middle class of the "non poor" has not taken concrete action to prevent human rights abuses and struggle for law enforcement and justice in favour of the destitutes. Moreover, because of the weakness of the political representative system, popular participation has been limited.

On the other hand, the fight is no more limited to human rights entities, all organized groups have social and economic equality as an objective in their programmes. New actors are revindicating their social, economic and cultural rights: women, racial minorities, rural workers, indigenous people, etc. These revindications are mostly formulated in terms of collective rights, as the defense of individual rights is no longer sufficient. Moreover, in the case of these violations, the role of the civil society is vital, as the state cannot bring about solutions on its own (Stavenhagen, 1990; Poppovic, 1992). Today more than ever an alliance is needed between state and society, poor and rich, human rights entities and other groups. Without a mobilization of all the forces and a massive popular participation, democracy will be jeopardized.

57. Time is short. Our common future is in danger. The gradual approach to the implementation of economic and social rights cannot be acceptable in the present conjuncture. Immediate concerted action has to tackle the everspreading problem of poverty that is threatening stability at national and international level. The images of poverty, destitution and violence on our TV screen are but an instant glimpse of a tragedy, where hundreds of millions of innocent people are suffering in a world that would have the means to attend to their needs. What is missing is not food or resources at planetarian level, but the solidarity of those who have achieved freedom from want. The "apartheid", between those who are "expendable" and those who have a say, must be dismantled both within nations and in inter-state relations.

There is no magic solution, and we are fully aware that the process of integrating the poor in the new world order will neither be painless nor without resistance. However, we do believe that the still erected wall of shame between the North and the South, between rich and poor, has to be torn down with a view to building together a new future. The task is huge, urgent and vital, but by no means impossible. It requires awareness of what is at stake, political will, and persistance.

In the long run, the world could only be better if it were for all to enjoy. Happiness must be global.

APPENDIX I: INDICATORS USED IN DATA ANALYSIS

The analysis presented in this document is based on various economic, social and political indicators. The number of countries represented is indicated between brackets with the year to which they refer, for example, in the symbol for analysing 160 countries in 1989 is (n89 = 160). The following provides a description of each indicator, its source, the symbol used in the tables and appendix and the year the data was collected.

ECONOMIC INDICATORS:

Gross national product per capita (PNBCAPTA, PNBCAPT9): UNDP Human Development Report, 1991 and 1992. Measured in real $US. Data from 1988 and 1989. (n88 = 160, n89 = 139)

Real gross domestic product per capita (PIBREAL, PIBREAL9): UNDP Human Development Report, 1991 and 1992. Expressed in international dollars and converted to an international scale through use of a conversion factor of purchasing power parity instead of exchange rates. Data from 1988 and 1989. (n88 = 133, n89 = 133)

Rate of annual growth of GNP per capita (TAXAPNB): UNDP Human Development Report, 1991. Data from 1980 to 1988. (n = 131)

Total external debt (DVIDATO): UNDP Human Development Report, 1991. Measured as a percentage of GNP. Data from 1988. (n = 92)

Debt service ratio (SERVIDIV): UNDP Human Development Report, 1991. Measured by the debt service requirements as a percentage of total exports. Data from 1988. Developing countries only. (n = 93)

Debt service ratios: The World Bank, Trends in Developing Economies, 1991. Ratios include: total external debt as a percentage of total exports (DIVIDEXP, n = 94), total external debt as a percentage of GDP (DIVIDGDP, n = 94), and debt service as a percentage of total exports (SERVIEXP, n = 97). Data from 1987 to 1989. Developing countries only.

Gross international reserves (RESERVAS): UNDP Human Development Report, 1992. Holdings of monetary gold, special drawing rights, reserve positions in IMF, and foreign exchange under the control of monetary authorities expressed in terms of the number of months of imports of goods and services these could pay for at the current level of imports. Data from 1989. (n = 105)

SOCIAL INDICATORS:

Human Development Index (HDI): UNDP Human Development Report, 1991 and 1992. This indicator is a composite of GDP per capita, adult literacy, mean years schooling, and life expectancy. For further details concerning the exact combination of these indicators, consult the respective reports. Data from 1991 and 1992. (n = 160)

Projected population growth (CREPOPUL): UNDP Human Development Report, 1992. Projected growth between 1990 and 2000. (n = 141)

Average life expectancy at birth (ESPVIDA): UNDP Human Development Report, 1991. Measured in years. Data from 1990. (n = 160)

Infant mortality - under age 5 (TAXAMORT): UNDP Human Development Report, 1991. Measured by the number of deaths of infants under the age of five per 1000 live births. Data from 1990. Developing countries only. (n = 124)

Adult illiteracy rate (ANALFADU): UNDP Human Development Report, 1991. Measured by the percentage of adults age 15 or older who cannot read and write at a level sufficient to write and comprehend a short exposition about their daily life. Data from 1990. Developing countries only. (n = 104)

Literacy rate - 1985 (ALFABET): UNDP Human Development Report, 1991. Measured by the percentage of individuals age 15 or older who can read and write at a level sufficient to write and comprehend a short exposition about their daily life. Data from 1985. (n = 160)

Average daily caloric intake per capita (CALORIAS): UNDP Human Development Report, 1991. Measured as a percentage of daily calorie requirements. Data from 1984 to 1986. Developing countries only. (n = 119)

Access to potable water (AGUAPOT): UNDP Human Development Report, 1991. Measured by the percentage of the population with access to potable water. Data from 1988. Developing countries only. (n = 80)

Access to health services (ACESAUDE): UNDP Human Development Report, 1992. Measured by the percentage of the population with access to local health services. Data from 1987 to 1989. Developing countries only. (n = 92)

Immunization rate (IMUNIZ): UNDP Human Development Report, 1992. Measured by the average vaccination rate among infants under age one for the four antigens used in the Universal Child Immunization Program. Data from 1988 to 1990. Developing countries only. (n = 123)

Military expenditures as a percentage of expenditures on health care and education combined (GSTMILSE): UNDP Human Development Report, 1992. Data from 1988 to 1990. (n = 100)

POLITICAL INDICATORS:

Index of democratization (ID1988): Tatu Vanhanen, 1991. Data from 1988. A composite of two indicators: participation (based on the percentage of the population voting in presidential and/or parliamentary elections) and competition (based on the smaller parties' share of votes cast in parliamentary and/or presidential elections). Data from 1980 to 1988. (n = 145)

Index of power resources (IPR): Tatu Vanhanen, 1991. Created to attempt to measure the dispersion of political resources. A composite indicator composed of: *percentage of urban population* (UP), *percentage of nonagricultural population* (NAP - versus AP = percentage of agricultural population), *number of students in universities and other degree-granting institutions* (STUD - percentage per 100,000 inhabitants, using 5000/100,000 as 100%), *literacy rate* (LIT), *share of family farms* (FF - percentage share of family farms of the total area of holdings) and the *degree of decentralization of nonagricultural economic resources* (DDN - the combined percentages of "1- the public sector's share of productive capacity or of employment in

nonagricultural sectors of economy, or in the most important sector of it; 2- the share of foreign-owned enterprises of productive capacity or of employment in nonagricultural sectors of economy, or in the most important sector of it; and 3- the share of a few and big domestic-owned or controlled private enterprises of productive capacity or of employment in nonagricultural sectors of economy, or in the most important sector of it). Data from 1980 to 1988. (n=145) They are combined in the following manner:

$$\frac{\text{mean(NAP \& UP)} * \text{mean(STUD \& LIT)} * (<FF*AP>+<DDN*NAP>)}{10{,}000}$$

Human rights violations (DEMOCRAC): Pourgerami, 1991. Measured by the number of different types of human rights violations committed (data source: Amnesty International), and scaled from 1= most violations to 5= least violations. Data from Amnesty International Reports, 1984 to 1986. (n=92)

APPENDIX II - DATA

Item A)

We have used the Pearson production-moment correlation coefficient to establish this relation. The coefficient correlation varies between -1 and +1 for perfect linear relation between two variables, taking into account that it does not indicate either the direction or the causality of the relation, and that the observed association may be due to other factors. The correlation is stronger when nearer to plus or minus 1, and weaker when nearer to 0.

The first line gives the Pearson correlation coefficient; the second, between brackets, the number of cases used; and the third is the probability of obtaining at random a coefficient as extreme as observed. For the latter correlations with a probability P > 0.005 is considered significant. The Pearson coefficient is positive when the relation is directe, and negative when it is inverse. For the definition of variables, see Appendix I.

Correlations:	PIBREAL	PNBCAPTA	TAXAPNB
DIVIDATO	-.2946	-.2837	.1746
	(81)	(92)	(83)
	P= .004	P= .003	P= .057
SERVIDIV	.0792	.0298	-.3108
	(80)	(93)	(85)
	P= .242	P= .388	P= .002
RESERVAS	.3004	.2650	.4034
	(80)	(83)	(79)
	P= .003	P= .008	P= .000
DIVIDEXP	-.3490	-.3232	.2681
	(84)	(94)	(84)
	P= .001	P= .001	P= .007
DIVIDGDP	-.2864	-.2592	.3278
	(84)	(94)	(84)
	P= .004	P= .006	P= .001

(Coefficient / (Cases) / 1-tailed Significance)

Item B) Correlations:

	PNBCAPTA	PNBCAPT9	PIBREAL	PIBREAL9
IDH92*	.6733	.6819	.7932	.7804
	(160)	(139)	(133)	(133)
	P= .000	P= .000	P= .000	P= .000
ACESAUDE	.4854	.4592	.5888	.5555
	(92)	(80)	(79)	(80)
	P= .000	P= .000	P= .000	P= .000
CREPOPUL	-.6021	-.6141	-.6601	-.6642
	(141)	(123)	(126)	(120)
	P= .000	P= .000	P= .000	P= .000
ESPVIDA	.6113	.6254	.7435	.7194
	(160)	(139)	(133)	(133)
	P= .000	P= .000	P= .000	P= .000
CALORIAS	.5431	.5752	.6623	.6384
	(119)	(104)	(98)	(103)
	P= .000	P= .000	P= .000	P= .000
AGUAPOT	.6345	.6209	.6918	.6667
	(80)	(72)	(73)	(73)
	P= .000	P= .000	P= .000	P= .000
ALFABET	.5271	.5485	.6423	.6129
	(160)	(139)	(133)	(133)
	P= .000	P= .000	P= .000	P= .000
TAXAMORT	-.5027	-.4963	-.6366	-.5909
	(124)	(107)	(99)	(104)
	P= .000	P= .000	P= .000	P= .000

(Coefficient / (Cases) / 1-tailed Significance)

* IDH is highly correlated with these income measures partly because they form components of the IDH.

Item C)

Regression analysis are used commonly to solve the problem of predicting a score for the individual case, given some prior information about it. Assim, por exemplo, sabendo-se qual o GNP per capita de um país é possível prever qual a expectativa de vida de sua população ou qual seu índice de democratização. Them, we are going to act as though the true relation between GNP per capita and life expectancy or index of democratization actually were a function, and, using a function rule, make predictions or "bets" about life expectancy or democratization values from knowledge of GNP per capita values.

GNP PER CAPITA AND LIFE EXPECTANCY / HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES

Outliers - Standardized Residual
- Selected Cases

Case #	COUNTRIES	*ZRESID
7	ARABIA S	-3.30650
49	EMIRADOS	-1.86624
122	QATAR	-1.83875

51	ESPANHA	1.35257
71	HONG KON	1.33430
35	CHIPRE	1.17893
12	BAHAMAS	-1.02535
80	ISRAEL	.84832
13	BAHRAIN	-.82421
69	HOLANDA	.81812

GNP PER CAPTA AND LIFE EXPECTANCY / MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES

Outliers - Standardized Residual
- Selected Cases

Case #	COUNTRIES	*ZRESID
5	ANGOLA	-3.07819
58	GABAO	-2.65983
133	SENEGAL	-2.53695
158	YEMEN	-1.98768
84	JAMARIHI	-1.98407
28	CAMARAO	-1.76977
41	COSTA DO	-1.73479
38	CONGO	-1.73450
46	DOMINICA	1.68646
42	COSTA RI	1.50079

GNP PER CAPTA AND LIFE EXPECTANCY / LOW INCOME COUNTRIES

Outliers - Standardized Residual
- Selected Cases

Case #	COUNTRIES	*ZRESID
34	CHINA	2.52849
139	SRI LANK	2.34145
157	VIETNAM	1.79558
65	GUINEA	-1.79489
106	MYANMAR	1.65416
134	SERRA LE	-1.57629
102	MAURITAN	-1.44134
64	GUIANA	1.33834
131	SAO TOME	1.29434
45	DJIBOUTI	-1.29162

Item D)

GNP PER CAPTA AND INDEX OF DEMOCRATIZATION/ HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES

Outliers - Standardized Residual
- Selected Cases

Case #	COUNTRIES	*ZRESID
49	EMIRADOS	-1.92315
22	BRUNEI	-1.90121
88	KUWAIT	-1.78626
122	QATAR	-1.58584
13	BARHAIN	-1.37848
7	ARABIA S	-1.37040
81	ITALIA	1.27887
16	BELGICA	1.25352
44	DINAMARC	1.09420
79	ISLANDIA	1.02841

GNP PER CAPTA AND INDEX OF DEMOCRATIZATION/ MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES

Outliers - Standardized Residual
- Selected Cases

Case #	COUNTRIES	*ZRESID
154	URUGUAI	2.80246
116	PAPUA NO	2.41284
62	GRECIA	2.27680
101	MAURICIO	1.80103
99	MALTA	1.79055
121	PORTUGAL	1.63331
9	ARGENTIN	1.43352
39	COREA,RE	1.23075
42	COSTA RI	1.21934
32	CHECOSLO	-1.16409

GNP PER CAPTA AND INDEX OF DEMOCRATIZATION/ LOW INCOME COUNTRIES

Outliers - Standardized Residual
- Selected Cases

Case #	COUNTRIES	*ZRESID
74	INC	2.99059
139	SRI LANK	2.85059
59	GAMBIA	2.50185
117	PAQUISTA	2.08765
140	SUDAO	1.71396
94	MADAGASC	1.59530
64	GUIANA	.93076
92	LIBERIA	.89205
102	MAURITAN	-.86789
45	DJIBOUTI	-.86789

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